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Much of economics is built on the assumption of individuals being driven by self-interest 
and economic development as an outcome of the free play of such individuals. On the few 
occasions that economics recognizes the role of altruism and trust, the tendency is to build these 
from the axiom of individually selfishness. The aim of this paper is to break away from this 
individualistic tradition and to treat as a primitive that individuals have hard-wired in them the 
‘cooperative spirit’, which allows them often to work in their collective interest, even when that 
may not be in their self-interest.  The main objective of the paper is to track the interface 
between altruism and group identity. By using the basic structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
among randomly picked individuals and building into it assumptions of general or in-group 
altruism, the paper demonstrates how our selfish rationality interacts with our innate sense of 
cooperation. The model is used to outline circumstances under which cooperation will occur and 
circumstances where it will break down. The paper also studies how sub-groups of a society can 
form cooperative blocks, whether to simply do better for themselves or exploit others. 
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Identity and Altruism: The Moral Basis of Prosperity and Oppression 
 
1.  Celebrating Self-Interest 
 
  That the butcher, the baker and the bee-keeper, each pursuing his or her self-interest, can 
bring about social order, whereby the meat arrives on the diner’s table, the bread gets delivered 
to the street corner deli, and honey travels from the remote Tasmanian farm to the Edinburgh 
restaurant, was a stunning intellectual insight.  It is not surprising that when, on 9 March, 1776, 
Adam Smith’s book, The Wealth of Nations, containing this proposition was published it was 
quickly recognized as a classic
1.  So enamoured were the political economists of that time and 
their progeny, the economists, that this became the central tenet of economic theory. That 
individuals would be self-seeking was not just taken to be a fact, but celebrated. Development 
and growth were attributed to the actions of such atomistic selfish individuals. This, in turn, has 
tended to obscure the fact that rapid growth and successful development may also require 
individual integrity and altruism, and the ability of individuals to forego some personal 
advantages for reasons of societal benefit. 
   In the early nineties I used to take a team of research students to a cluster of villages in 
one of the most anarchic and poor regions of India—now in the state of Jharkhand. Seeing the 
utter chaos in the region, some may have proffered the popular advice that for development what 
is needed is for less government and for individuals to be left free to pursue their self-interest. 
But such an advice would be quite absurd in this case.--There was no trace of any government 
for ‘less government’ to be a feasible option. And there was no dearth of individually selfish 
behavior either. What was lacking was the fauna and flora of social values and the cooperative 
spirit that make economic efficiency and development possible. Contrary to what many 
textbooks teach us, the regions of the world which are economically the biggest disasters are 
often the ones which are models of the free market, with amoral individuals seeking nothing but 
their own self-aggrandizement.  
                                                 
1 It is interesting to note that, in the first two or three decades after the book came out, Smith was considered a 
renegade thinker (Rothschild, 2001). He would become the voice of orthodoxy and be claimed by the conservatives 
only after the safety of his death in 1790.       3
  Ever since Adam Smith’s classic, methodological individualism has become such a 
deeply entrenched foundation stone of economics that the predominant tendency has been to 
refuse to admit that a person can and often does act in his national interest or class interest or 
caste interest or interest based on some other collective identity. When we want to recognize 
such collective interests, the methodologically acceptable method among economists has been to 
derive the social or cooperative behavior from the primitive of self-interest. 
The aim of this paper is to break away from this individualistic tradition and to treat as a 
primitive the fact that individuals have hard-wired in them, admittedly to varying extents, the 
‘cooperative spirit’, which allows them to often work in the collective interest, even when that 
may not be in their self-interest and to make sacrifices for the sake of fairness and integrity.
2 
  It must be put on record that, though the central tendency in economics has been to deny 
the cooperative spirit, there is now a body of writers who have recognized this and have even 
constructed models to make amends for it (see, for instance, Knack and Keefer, 1997; Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Hoff, Kshetramade and Fehr, 2006; Benabou and Tirole, 
2006).
 3 And sociologists, cognitive psychologists and moral philosophers have for long written 
about the importance of trust and altruism among people, and how these are important for more 
complex relationships to thrive and for a group or a nation to progress economically (e.g., 
Luhman, 1979; Gambetta, 1990; Fukuyama, 1996; Hauser, 2006). That human beings have 
innate social and normative values is increasingly recognized in our formal social-science 
models, thanks to the new literature on ‘behavioral economics’
4 (though it is a bit alarming that 
social-scientists needed a large literature to realize this)
5.  
                                                 
2 This is not to deny that many interesting questions of fairness and justice can be raised within the domain of self-
interested players. I explored some of this in Basu (2000). Recently, Myerson (2004) has developed the ingenious 
approach of modeling justice as a method of selecting equlibria in contexts where there are multiple equilibria and, 
left to anarchy, agents can end up in the equilibrium where everybody is worse off.   
3 One area where the cooperative spirit has been an accepted assumption is the analysis of the household and 
economists and sociologists have tended to take a relatively common approach (see Basu, 2006; Blumberg and 
Coleman, 1989). Zelizer (2005, p. 165) observes, “[The] mixture of caring and economic activity within households 
takes place in a context of incessant negotiation, sometimes cooperative, other times full of conflict.”  
4 See, for instance, the paper by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005), which summarizes some of this, with 
emphasis on how our rational selves combine with our other selves to guide what we ultimately choose. 
5 Outside of the social sciences, it is well-recognized that individuals are not always relentless maximizers of 
material wealth. In his novel, Mating (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1991), after discussing how people generally 
“want more,” Norman Rush goes on to observe (p. 5), “The average Black African has the opposite problem: he or 
she does not want enough.” And recognizing that this causes distress to social scientists, he goes on to observe, “A 
whole profession called Rural Animation exists devoted to making villagers want more and work harder to get it.”   4
In the light of this existing research, the main objective of the paper is not just to 
acknowledge that human beings have these traits, but to track their consequences in an area that 
has received little attention—the interface between altruism, identity and welfare. I will assume 
that the ‘utils’ that measure a person’s welfare need not coincide with the ‘payoffs’ that 
individuals seek to maximize through their behavior and acts of choice. Altruism, in particular, 
can cause a divergence between the two.  
The formal analysis begins by demonstrating a kind of converse of the celebrated 
‘invisible hand theorem’ of economics, which asserts that, even though each individual may be 
innately selfish, the collection of such selfish behavior, mediated through the market, leads to 
socially optimal outcomes. I shall here argue that human beings are innately social, altruistic and 
other-regarding
6 and, while these traits typically aid cooperative behavior, there are situations 
where, despite each individual’s instinctive cooperative spirit, social optimality breaks down. In 
other words, the invisible hand is not always benevolent; it can work in reverse, whereby a group 
of innately altruistic individuals can behave in a way, which is collectively ruinous for them. I do 
not think that the villagers of the Jharkhand village I mentioned above are innately any different 
from the citizens of more prosperous and well-organized communities. They are caught in a 
malevolent equilibrium. The possibility of such malevolent equilibria is, in itself, well-known 
and can be illustrated by lots of standard games. My plan is to take this forward in two ways. It is 
first illustrated how such an equilibrium can be pervasive with incomplete information and how 
there can be a domino effect. Then I study the consequences of in-group altruism and identity. 
The paper is focused largely on positive analysis. While I do comment on normative 
matters, I deliberately do not take a normative stand on the cooperative spirit. This is because the 
same spirit of cooperation that promotes economic progress can be, and in the long history of 
mankind there are many instances where it has been, turned against other groups, usually 
minorities, but also majorities that are disorganized and unable to promote their own cooperative 
spirit of resistance. This is an important problem of the inter-face between identity and altruism. 
When a people’s altruism is confined to some in-group, this can lead to even greater oppression 
than oppression by selfish but atomistic individuals. For one, group oppression allows for the 
free-riding of guilt among the oppressors.  
  
                                                 
6 This is not to deny that these qualities can be enhanced or muted, through appropriate nurture   5
 
2.  Worldly Contexts 
 
  In one of his recent books, Amartya Sen (2005, pp. 335-6) asks the interesting question  
why British investment which came so plentifully to so many sectors (such as tea, coffee, 
railways and jute) of its prize colony, India, nevertheless failed to come in, in any substantial 
measure, into the cotton textile, iron and steel. He then points out that these were central to the 
old established industries of Britain in Manchester and elsewhere. But that still does not explain 
why the bureaucrats of the Raj, who had no direct interest in these industries, would deprive 
India of capital. To close the argument, Sen notes that we have to recognize that a “general sense 
of social identity and priorities, which are known to play a considerable part in economic 
decisions in general, exerted significant influence on the pattern of British investment in India.” 
The British bureaucrats were working not in their self-interest but in the interest of the group that 
they identified with. 
  The converse was also true. When, in the early twentieth century, insurgency and 
uprisings against British rule started in many places in India, especially Bengal, there was some 
puzzlement on the part of the British, as was evident from the Rowlatt Sedition Committee 
Report of 1918, about the fact that the leaders of these insurgencies were usually from among the 
English-educated elites (known among the British as “gentlemanly terrorists”), employed by the 
British and the ones to gain most from the persistence of British rule (Ghosh, 2005). The answer 
once again lies in identity. These elites identified themselves more with the Indian masses than 
with the British rulers and were willing to make personal sacrifices in order to promote the group 
interest. Winston Churchill was known to be puzzled and irritated by this deficiency of narrow 
self-interest among the Indian elites fighting for the nation’s freedom. This is not to deny that 
people also have strong self-interests and, with even more skillfully designed incentives, the 
British rulers may have been able to keep the Indian elites behaviorally loyal to the Raj. But, in 
fact, to design such incentives right, one has to keep in mind that self-interest is often mediated 
by one’s collective-identity interest, and the analytics of this, as we shall presently see, can be 
complicated even in the simple world of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
In addition to examples from out in the world, there is now plenty of evidence from 
controlled experiments that people can work in their collective interests, even when that entails   6
making personal sacrifices and, in addition, the trust and the altruism can be conditional on who 
they are interacting with, even when they are all strangers. That human beings have these 
additional ‘moral preferences’, like the desire to reciprocate and win approval in the eyes of 
others and, at times, of one’s own conscience is now well-documented.
7 An interesting set of 
experiments was conducted by Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) on students from the University of 
Haiffa, Academic College of Tel Aviv and Tel Aviv University. They were made to play the 
‘Trust game’, in which trust can generate wealth but it requires each player to curb his or her 
self-interested behavior.    
Fershtman and Gneezy found that, not only is trust widespread, but a large number of 
agents are willing to go all the way in trusting others so as to achieve the efficient outcome.
8 But 
what is more, Fershtman and Gneezy demonstrated that trust can be identity conditional. Close to 
60% of the individuals playing this game chose to be trusting when their opponent was of 
Ashkenazic origin; but only 20% chose to be trusting when the opponent happened to be of 
Eastern origin. Similar results of conditional trust have been reported from other experiments by 
other researchers (Eckel and Wilson, 2002; Burns, 2004). 
  The objective of the next sections is to take some of these ideas—of our innate 
cooperativeness and also our ability to vary the extent of cooperativeness depending on who we 
are interacting with--to an abstract analytical model and track their consequence for efficiency 
and development. Under what conditions does the cooperative spirit result in cooperation? And 
when does cooperation break down, despite individuals having an in-built cooperativeness?  
  
3.  Games and Allegories 
 
3.1  Basic Framework 
  Instead of assuming that human beings are selfish and they ‘cooperate’ only when 
‘cooperation’ is a derivative of selfish behavior,
9 as most economics models suppose, I shall here 
                                                 
7 See, for instance, the discussion by Fehr and Falk (2002). They show, interestingly, that not only are these other 
traits a part of the human psyche but, at times, monetary incentives can actually backfire because they can weaken 
one of these other motivations for human action. Our morals can also take the form of wanting to punish cheats, 
even when that is costly to oneself (Hoff, Kshetramade and Fehr, 2006). In an earlier work, this, coupled with the 
instinct to cooperate with others is described as ‘strong reciprocity’ (Gintis et al, 2003). 
8 There is now a substantial literature that reports similar findings of trust and altruism in experimental situations 
from around the world. See Ensminger, 2000; Heinrich et al, 2004. 
9 One may legitimately wonder why the word cooperation should be used in such cases.   7
assume that the cooperative instinct is innately human.  Just as self-interest creates drive and 
ambition, so can these other social concerns.  But, more importantly, it is these other social 
characteristics--mainly the cooperative instinct--that provide the glue to hold society together 
and prepare the ground for markets to function efficiently (Granovetter, 1985; Elster, 1989; 
Arrow, 1998; Nee and Ingram, 1998; Platteau, 2000; Basu, 2000; Francois, 2002).  Turning this 
argument around, we could claim that economies can fail when the cooperative instinct breaks 
down. Traditional economics, rooted in methodological individualism, makes no room for our 
innate cooperative spirit and so is handicapped in commenting on its breakdown.  Hence, the aim 
of this paper is to introduce a modicum of non-individualistic behavior as basic to individuals, 
and then to build from that. 
  There are many different kinds of games that can be used to understand the connection 
between trust, altruism and identity – for instance, the Trust Game, the Ultimatum game and the 
Traveler’s Dilemma (Basu, 2000; Heinrich et al, 2004; Bowles, 2004). But let me here use what 
is, arguably, the most familiar game in the social sciences – the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Moreover, 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been used very elegantly by Sen (1974) to motivate the dilemma 
individuals face between their selfish wants and innate value judgments.  The game is illustrated 
below in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 Player  2 
 C D 
C  6, 6  0, 8 
D  8, 0  3, 3 
 





Though its mathematical structure is standard, it will be played differently than in most 
textbooks.  Hence, it needs some explanation.  What is illustrated above are the dollar payoffs 
and I shall take it (purely for expositional ease) that each number represents an index of each 
person’s overall well-being, for instance, units of utility. It is convenient to assume that ‘utils’ 
match one-on-one with dollars. So in this game player 1 can choose between C and D and   8
likewise for player 2.  It is a useful mnemonic to think of C as ‘cooperative behavior’ and D as 
‘defection’.  If player 1 chooses C and 2 chooses D – something that can equivalently be 
described as “if players 1 and 2 choose (C,D)” – then 1 earns $0 and 2 earns $8.  If they choose 
(D,C), they earn 8 and 0 dollars, respectively, or (8,0), in brief.  And so on.  This entire 
information is summarized in Table 1. 
  The standard analysis of the game goes as follows.  Place yourself in the shoes of player 
1 and observe that if player 2 chooses C, you are better off choosing D instead of C, since 8 > 6.  
And if player 2 chooses D, you are better off choosing D instead of C, since 3 > 0.  Hence, no 
matter what the other player does, it is better for you to choose D. Because the game is 
symmetric for the two players, each player will reason the same way.  Hence, the outcome will 
be (D,D) – both players will choose defection  -- and so they will earn $3 each.  It is an 
unfortunate outcome since they could have earned $6 each if both chose C, the cooperative 
strategy. 
  But, in reality, people do not just maximize their own dollar incomes or even their own 
utilities. People typically have fellow feelings, altruism, senses of fairness and the urge not to 
hurt others (or, in some cases, to hurt others).  To keep the analysis as simple as possible, I shall 
simply allow for one kind of ‘social feeling’ in this formal analysis, that of altruism
10.  This will 
be captured by assuming as if $1 (or, what is the same in this paper, 1 util) earned by the other 
player is valued by this player as equal to α  dollars of his own, where  1 0 ≤ ≤α .  Later I shall 
allow the possibility of α  varying depending on who the other player is.  Thus, α  may be 1 for 
kin, ½ for kith, and 0 for an alien; and so on.  But let us, for now, treat this as fixed.  Hence, now 
if player 1 plays C and 2 plays C, player 1’s behavior is predicted by treating her (effective) 
payoff as 6 + 6α . It is possible to argue that the altruism that I feel for another person depends 
on the altruism he or she is expected to feel for me or how nice she is to me (Rabin, 1993; 
Levine, 1998; Gintis et al, 2003). Bringing in such interdependent altruism parameters would 
also allow us to talk about trust and other kinds of social behavior. But I leave such complexities 
out of the present paper. Taking a rather novel route, Sen (1974) argued that our morals may be 
viewed as a meta-ordering, that is, an ordering over the orderings of all the possible outcomes of 
                                                 
10 That people do more for one another than would be dictated by purely selfish considerations is widely noted from 
various walks of life. Laborers typically work harder than can be explained purely in terms of their direct self-
interest (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Minkler, 2004). Caregivers often give more care than they are required to give in 
terms of their job requirements (Zelizer, 2005).   9
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is interesting to see that, using α, amounts to creating a moral ideal 
ordering over the four outcomes of the game; and setting α = 0, amounts to capturing the 
selfishly best (or least morally-tainted) ordering.  So there is an implicit meta-binary relation 
suggested by the approach taken here
11. 
  Two important clarifications are worth placing on record here. First, one question that 
may arise in the reader’s mind is about the meaning of selfishness. It appears at first sight that, 
once the ∀ is treated as a part of a person’s preference, she can, then on, be thought of being 
perfectly selfish, since it is her preference to give a weight of ∀ to others’ income. So, it seems 
arguable that, given her preference, she is just as selfish as a person who values only his own 
dollars
12. The problem with this critique is that it reduces selfishness to a tautology; selfishness 
then becomes impervious to criticism. To counter this, what has to be kept in mind is that, 
contrary to what many economists claim, it is not a tautological definition of selfishness that 
economics uses. Economists would not have been able to derive any testable proposition if they 
did so, because all behavior would then be compatible with selfishness and so the selfishness 
assumption would not be able to predict any particular behavior.  
Hence, the way I view ∀ here is not as an innate part of a person’s utility but simply as a 
guide to a person’s behavior. Indeed, it may not be a part of our preference; it could be simply 
that we behave as if we valued other people’s dollars by that amount. A player’s welfare or level 
of utility is throughout measured by the utils shown in Table 1. It is simply that people do not 
play to maximize their utility but a hybrid of their utility and their social and moral sense, 
captured by ∀. Consider a person who gives $1,000 to a charity. It would be reasonable to say 
that he preferred to give this money (that would be pretty normal use of English). But would we 
say that he is better off by giving the $1,000 to the charity? Many mainstream economists would 
say yes, but I would contest this and argue that the person is worse off (in terms of most 
                                                 
11 Beyond this we know little about the binary relation. It may be incomplete and also violate transitivity. It is 
arguable that when we try to rank alternatives that can be evaluated by different yardsticks, intransitivity and 
incompleteness are more likely to occur. We may then need to use other kinds of relational concepts such as “being 
on par” or reconcile to the conundrums that arise with transitivity (Qizilbash, 2003; Basu, 2007). These are more 
likely to happen in contexts of moral binary relations. Fortunately, the route I am taking here, via the simple use of α 
keeps us clear from these kinds of philosophical intricacies. 
12 This refers to a much larger problem, namely, that of interpreting the payoffs in a game. We can of course write 
down the number that each player will earn but there is no easy way of representing what this means to the player, 
who may ‘correct’ the number psychologically to take account of fairness, altruism and so on. Not surprisingly, this 
problem arises more seriously in sociological games and one of the earliest discussions of this problem occurred in   10
reasonable interpretations of well-being and welfare) but that he, nevertheless, prefers to make 
that little sacrifice for a good cause
13. Otherwise, “making a sacrifice” would have to be deleted 
from our lexicons. This divergence between the index of individual well-being and what guides 
individual behavior needs some getting used to since it is alien to traditional choice theory. 
Fortunately, there is a small literature in game theory that inclines towards this: see Weibull 
(2004), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005).
14  
Another way to get to the same conclusion is by a slightly unusual use of the familiar 
mathematical method of “proof by contradiction”. Assume (as many economics textbooks do) 
that a person’s choice always and fully reflects his or her utility or welfare. Economists often try 
to prevent excessive government intervention by arguing that, if an exchange or trade enhances 
the utilities of the buyer and the seller, and has no negative fall-out on a third party, then there is 
no moral justification for stopping the trade or exchange (the Paretian argument). Whether or not 
we believe in the Paretian normative criterion,
15 let us go along with it here. Suppose a politician 
bans the sale of houses and apartments. The standard argument that economists use against such 
an ill-conceived intervention is to point out that if an adult wants to sell his house and another 
adult wants to buy it, it is reasonable to expect that they will be better off by this, and since this 
is no one else’s concern, this is a Pareto improvement; and so government should not ban it. But 
note that the politician can easily contend that since she is against the sale, (and choice reflects 
utility), the sale is no longer a Pareto improvement.  
So by this argument no government intervention can ever be stopped on the ground that 
the intervention stops a Pareto improvement, because the mere fact of the politician intervening 
to stop a transaction makes the transaction a non-Pareto-improvement. This somewhat absurd 
conclusion arises from the supposition that choice always reflects the chooser’s welfare. Indeed 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bernard (1954)--see also Swedberg (2001). Weibull (2004) encounters the same problem when analyzing the 
problem of interpreting results from experimental games. 
13 In a paper focused wholly on this subject, we would distinguish between two kinds of other-regarding behavior. 
When a person makes a sacrifice for her child, for instance, it is arguable that this behavior is an extension of a 
person’s selfishness, since a child’s welfare is often internalized by us. But when one makes a contribution to some 
social charity or helps a person one does not know, it is arguable that this entails personal sacrifice. One does it not 
to gratify oneself but because one believes that one should this. Behaviorally the two cases may look the same but 
they are prompted by different internal processes and therefore would be evaluated differently when we normatively 
compare the outcomes.  In this paper I am considering the latter kind of model for ‘other-regarding’ behavior. 
14 Sen (2006, p.21) discusses the standard question economists ask “If it is not in your interest why did you choose 
to do what you did?” and observes: “This wise-guy skepticism makes huge idiots out of Mohandas Gandhi, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Mother Teresa, and Nelson Mandela, and rather smaller idiots out of the rest of us …”  
15 There are critiques that have been aimed at this—see, for instance, Sen (1983).   11
it seems entirely plausible to me that a politician’s policy choice is not something that should be 
equated with the politician’s own utility.     
Once we distinguish between utility and payoff (the latter being an admittedly 
tautological index that reflects choice), we may also wish to distinguish between fitness and 
payoffs in evolutionary games—to allow for the fact that what people choose is not what 
invariably maximizes their fitness or survival chance. I shall not pursue this here but it is a 
direction worth pursuing in future. 
To sum up, there are three indicators associated with each person—the dollars earned by 
her, the utility she gets and what I call her ‘effective payoff’
16.  In this paper I treat the first two 
as the same. This is an innocuous assumption, made for expositional convenience. However, I 
treat the third as distinct from the other two. This is a significant assumption—one that is crucial 
to this paper. Hence, what is being assumed is that the effective payoff numbers are guides to 
human behavior. People behave as if they are maximizers of those numbers. Their well-being 
however is related to but distinct from those numbers. The well-being numbers are given in table 
1 and the effective payoffs are the numbers we get by making the α-based corrections to them.  
  Second, while formally what I am modeling is altruism rather than trust, it is reasonable 
to think of the model as an idiom for trust or other indicators of a person’s sense of society. As 
will be evident soon (from Figure 1 below), a person’s likelihood of cooperation depends on her 
expectation that the other person will cooperate. Hence, we could think of the player’s decision 
as follows. If she trusts that the other person will cooperate, then she will be more inclined to 
cooperate. Hence, the analysis that follows, while explicitly that of altruism, could also be 
thought of as a model of mutual trust.   
We could similarly, introduce stigma into the model by assuming that there is some 
stigma attached to being selfish and playing D. Of course, the person who chooses D need not be 
selfish but could be playing this in anticipation of the other player choosing D. But one of the 
functions of stigmatization, as pointed out by Gans (1972), is to scapegoat individuals in order to 
maintain certain norms of behavior. Further, in a more sophisticated and realistic model we may 
wish to allow for the fact that the α I attach to the other player’s utility would generally depend 
                                                 
16 Henceforth, a reference to payoff will mean effective payoff. And when I want to refer to a person’s direct well-
being (that is, the kind of numbers shown in Table 1), I shall speak of dollars or utility.   12
on how she achieved it. I may attach a higher α to her income if she achieves it through (C,C), 
than if she achieves it through (C,D). But I shall here stay away from such complications.  
 
3.2 Homogenous Society 
  Suppose we have a society with n individuals and players are randomly matched with 
each other and made to play the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Note that a society in which players 
manage to cooperate a lot will become richer and better off over time. And if we append to this 
simple model a larger economy so that people can save a part of their income (over and above 
what they need to consume) and earn interest on that, then a society that manages to reach the 
outcome (C,C) often could become many times more prosperous than a society that always 
reaches the outcome (D,D).  If, for instance, 3 is subsistence consumption, then the latter society 
will, presumably, have no savings, whereas the former will not only earn more, but save and 
become even richer in the long run. 
  Keeping in mind that the cooperative spirit, captured here by the altruism parameter, is 
natural to human beings, I want to locate conditions under which cooperation will occur and 
conditions where it will collapse into individualism and totally self-seeking behavior. 
  Let us begin by considering the case where a player is uncertain about how her opponent 
will play.  Suppose λ  is the probability that the other player will play cooperatively, that is, 
choose C. Then, if this player plays C, her expected (effective) payoff, denoted by u(C), will be 
given by: 
     . 8 ) 1 ( ) 6 6 ( ) ( α λ α λ − + + = C u  
And, if she chooses D, her expected payoff, u(D), is given as follows. 
) 3 3 )( 1 ( 8 ) ( α λ λ + − + = D u       
Hence, she will choose C if and only if 
       ) ( ) ( D u C u ≥









        ( 1 )  
Equation 1 can be used to draw a line in an  ) , ( λ α - space which marks the zone where a player 
will choose to play cooperatively. 
  In Figure 1, the line AB is the graph of (1), with the inequality sign replaced by an 
equality.  Hence, if, for some α , the λ  happens to be on or above the line AB, then a player will   13
choose to play C.  In other words, if a player’s altruism parameter, α , and her expectation that 
the other player will cooperate, captured by λ , are such that  ) , ( λ α  lies above the line AB, then 
and only then will she choose to cooperate. 
This however does not as yet tell us about how this society will behave.  This is because, 
while α  (the society’s altruism parameter) is being treated here as exogenously given,
17 λ  
cannot be exogenous.  Each individual’s decision on how to play the game determines what 
fraction of society will play C and this determines what 8 will be. Hence, we have to derive the 
value of λ . 
   















This is easily done. If α  is to the left of A, that is,  , 3 / 1 < α  then no matter what the value 
of λ , a person will choose D.  If everybody does this, λ  will in fact be 0. Likewise consider the 
case where α  is to the right of B, that is  . 5 / 3 > α  Then, no matter what value λ  takes, each 
player will choose C.  Hence λ  will be 1. 
                                                 
17 In a deeper work we may wish to derive this from more basic assumptions about human biology and psychology, 
but that is beyond the scope of the present paper.   14





≤ ≤α   Let me use  ) (α λ  to denote the point on the 
line AB.  That is,  ). 1 /( ) 5 3 ( ) ( α α α λ + − ≡   If  ), (α λ λ >  then a player confronting this λ  will 
choose C.  Since all players are identical, all will choose C under such circumstances; hence 
1 = λ .  If, on the other hand,  ), (α λ λ <  by a similar reasoning λ  will be 0. In other words, we 
have multiple equilibria. This will lead to threshold effects and tipping behavior, as in 
Granovetter and Soong (1983) and Schelling (1972), whereby behavior can swing over from one 
extreme to another once it goes over a critical line. Finally, if  ) (α λ λ = , then each player is 
indifferent between C and D.  Hence, it is, in principle, possible to have  n λ  players play C and 
n ) 1 ( λ −  players play D.  Hence,  ) (α λ λ =  is also an equilibrium, albeit a precarious one. 
  Gathering the above derivations together, we have the following possible societal 
equilibria.  If    . 0 , 3 / 1 = < λ α   If  . 1 , 5 / 3 = > λ α   If  , 5 / 3 3 / 1 ≤ ≤α  then  0 = λ  or 1 or  ) (α λ .  
This information is summed by the correspondence illustrated by the thickened line in Figure 1, 
denoted by FABO. 
  If we ignore the points on AB, which depict unstable equilibria (a slight perturbation will 
have society spiraling away to one of the two other equilibria), then we see that if altruism is 
very high  ) 5 / 3 ( > α cooperation will be automatic.  If altruism is very low  ), 3 / 1 ( < α  there can 
be no cooperation.  But with intermediate altruism there are multiple equilibria.  The same 
society can behave totally cooperatively or totally non-cooperatively.  By seeing one society 
behaving cooperatively and getting richer and another that is anarchistic, selfish and poor we 
cannot conclude that there are innate differences between the people of these societies.  It could 
simply be the case of both behaviors being self-sustaining in equilibrium; and so two ex ante-
identical societies could exhibit very different kinds of outcomes. 
  Some useful policy wisdom emerges from the above model.  What we have modeled here 
as altruism is part of a generalized idea of trust, other-regardingness and the social spirit.  There 
are situations in life – for instance, in starting a business – where we have to take the risk of 
vulnerability for the business to work.  This is akin to playing C in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  If 
your business partner (player 2) is cooperative (chooses C) you both do well, but if he betrays 
your trust, you will do badly (get 0).  Hence, as already suggested, the altruism parameter α  
could also be thought of as a propensity to trust.  So what this model shows is that altruism and 
trust are critical ingredients for a society to do well and prosper.  In the present model we have   15
treated α  as exogenous.  But we know at an intuitive level that people (especially children) can 
be taught or inspired to be more altruistic, more trustworthy and more trusting. Now, one person 
being more altruistic (having high α ) would not help that person economically.  In fact, he 
would be vulnerable to being cheated.  But, if at a societal level all individuals were more 
trusting, for instance, with α  going from less than 1/3 to over 1/3, then there would be the 
possibility of greater cooperation and, if α  went above 3/5, cooperation would occur for sure, 
with all the attendant economic benefits of higher income and higher utility, as shown in Table 1. 
  Hence, greater altruism and trust among a people is like a public good.  How exactly a 
government or an educational institute can create and nurture a more altruistic society we do not 
fully understand, but, at the same time, we do know that these traits change and can be changed.  
People can be taught not to litter the streets. Societies can cultivate habits of charity.  
Corporations can become environment conscious.  Even if we do not as yet understand how 
these things happen, it is important to recognize that (a) unselfishness and altruism are traits that 
are innately there in human beings and so can, potentially, be modified and nurtured, and (b) 
such traits are valuable for economic development and efficiency.   
  
3.3  Heterogeneous Society 
  All this time I have dealt with a society where all individuals have the same level of 
altruism.  But some of the more interesting and complex issues arise when we recognize that the 
‘cooperative spirit’, while innate, can vary across individuals. 
  What we are interested in understanding is what generates greater cooperative behavior  
among citizens.  The degree of altruism, α , is an instrument towards this.  In a homogeneous 
society, our aim would be to raise α  if we wished to make cooperation more likely.  But in a 
heterogeneous society the relation between the distribution of altruism and the possibility of 
cooperation can be complex.  Interestingly, a tiny change in α  can cause huge changes in 
behavior.  For instance, the addition of a small number of selfish individuals in a society can, like 
adding culture to milk, transform the character of the entire society, in this case to a non-
cooperating one.  Hence, the cooperative outcome can be a fragile equilibrium. 
  To understand this, let us suppose that person i has an altruism parameter of  . i α   If we 
number individuals from the most selfish (person 1) to the least selfish (person n) – and clearly 
there is no loss of generality in this – then we have:   16
     n n α α α α ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ −1 2 1 . . .       ( 2 )  
  An individual’s altruism parameter is not visible.  It will be assumed throughout that n is 
large; and that, when a player faces an opponent, she assumes that his altruism parameter is  1 α  
with probability  2 , / 1 α n  with probability 1/n and so on. 
  Consider first a case where all n persons have altruism parameters in the interval        
[1/3, 3/5].  It is then easy to see that everybody playing C is an equilibrium and everybody 
playing D is another equilibrium.  This is obvious.  Since each person’s α  lies between 1/3 and 
3/5 each person will choose C if he expects everybody else to choose C; and each person will 
choose D if he expects everybody to choose D. 
  What is interesting is that the introduction of one person can cause a breakdown in the 
cooperative equilibrium.  Indeed, the introduction of one low-α  (or high-selfishness) person can 
ensure that society will have a unique equilibrium, where nobody cooperates. 
  The algebra of this kind of result is rooted in the idea of ‘global games’ and Bayes-Nash 
equilibria; in different contexts a similar reasoning has been used by Morris and Shin (1998) and 
Baliga and Sjostrom (2004). The intuition is straightforward. Assume that the first t persons (i.e., 
persons 1 to t) prefer D over C.  Now consider the (t+1)
th person’s decision problem.  We know 
from (1), he will prefer D if 















Now, since the first t persons prefer D, the probability that a randomly chosen person will play D 
must be greater than or equal to t/n.  Hence, the λ  (probability that the other player will play C) 




  Hence, (continuing with the assumption that players 1 to t play D), player t+1 will 
certainly play D if 


















This may be rewritten as 







α         ( 3 )    17
This is the crucial equation that can be used to show how a small injection of selfish individuals 
into society can cause a total break down in cooperation. 
  Here is an example.  Let us start with a society of 9 individuals ranging from person 2 to 
person 10. So, as of now, mysteriously, there is no one called person 1.  For person t in this 
society let  t α  be equal to (t + 19)/60.  Hence, 









10 3 2 = = = α α α  
As we have already seen, since in this society all α ’s lie between 1/3 and 3/5, this society can be 
in an equilibrium where everybody cooperates at all times. 
  Let another person now join this society whose altruism parameter is 19/60. Call him 
person 1. That is,  60 / 19 1 = α . 
  So now we have a 10-person society.  It is easy to verify that, for every t, going from 1 to 
9, (3) holds.  Let us, for instance, check this for t = 5.  Since n = 10, the left-hand side of (3) is 
25/55.  Clearly this exceeds  . 60 / 25 6 = α  
  Next note that  . 3 / 1 1 < α   Hence, player 1 will certainly choose D.  Now, since all 
players, 2 to 10, (that is, t + 1 = 2, ..., 10), satisfy (3), we know that every player will strictly 
prefer D.  Hence, this society of 10 persons has a unique equilibrium, where nobody cooperates.  
Though everybody’s altruism parameter is unchanged, the injection of one habitual non-
cooperator results in a total breakdown of cooperation. 
  This result is akin to what I have in a different context described (Basu, 2005) as the 
‘malignancy of identity’ whereby what may be a dormant marker of identity with no 
consequence on behavior can, with a little egging on, acquire malignancy, leading to conflict 
between the races and different religious groups. This alerts us to the very real risk of how the 
injection of a small dose of new social norms or individuals carrying those different norms can 
create a cascading effect of change and breakdown.  This must be happening nowadays with the 
global movement of people.  And this must have happened in the heyday of colonialism, when 
the colonial masters arrived in new lands prepared to cooperate among themselves but not with 
the indigenous people.  Radical writing in developing countries often talks about how the 
harmony of these economically backward societies, which nevertheless may have had a high 
moral code of behavior among themselves, got disrupted by the colonial invasions.  There may 
be an element of exaggeration and false nostalgia, and a tendency to glorify the distant past in   18
this, but that huge disruptions in behavior codes and social norms can happen is clear enough, as 
the above theoretical construction illustrates.  Just as we now recognize that the injection of new 
viruses in a society can spell havoc, so can the injection of new norms. It is also conceivable that 
‘good norms’ carried into a society by newcomers can spread through the entire society. These 
are subjects that will need to be studied much more fully in the future.  What the above model 
does is to provide a few basic building blocks for such a venture. 
 
3.4  Alcoves of Altruism 
  Thus far, it was assumed that the altruism person i feels, she feels for everybody in her 
society.  But, as the last discussion in the above sub-section alerts us and the examples in section 
2 highlight, this need not be so.  People do have different ethics and altruism for in-groups and 
out-groups. There are many societies fractured along lines of race, gender, religion, country of 
origin, language identities and caste and people often show extra trust and have an altruism 
premium for those with whom they share some common identity (see Glaeser et al, 2000; 
Luttmer, 2001)
18. 
  With this recognition comes the possibility of many complexities.  The simplest case is 
where in-group trust partitions the society into different alcoves, within each of which there is 
trust and altruism and across which there may be little of those social feelings.  But there can 
occur situations where i treats j as belonging to i’s in-group, unaware that this feeling is not 
reciprocated.  Cooperation in a nation or a group can break down when there are these cross-
cutting allegiances.  If a nation tries to create fellow feeling among its citizens, but a subset of 
citizens have allegiance to an identity different from that of this citizenship, then cooperation can 
break down. 
  Moreover, in the previous sub-sections altruism was always good.  But in a society that is 
fractured, with altruism and trust confined to in-groups, these traits can become instruments of 
group oppression – where one group oppresses another, building up greater power in the 
                                                 
18 The importance of identity in determining behavior has long been recognized in sociology but is relatively new in 
economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Fryer and Jackson, 2003; Hoff and Pandey, 2003; Darity, Mason and 
Stewart, 2005; Basu, 2005; Iversen, 2005; Sen, 2006). Our identities are, however, not set in stone. The boundaries 
of our identities can be fuzzy and we often choose our identity and, equally, on occasions opt to overlook some of 
our existing identities. The reader should be warned that I take a very simplistic view of identity here because the 
aim is to solely illustrate the complications this brings into our analysis of altruistic behavior.   19
oppressing group than it would have managed if the members of the group tried to carry out the 
oppression atomistically. 
  These are directions that will take a lot of time and research effort to pursue.  What I will 
do here is to take some short, tentative steps to illustrate the scope of research that opens up once 
we allow altruism to be limited to those with whom a player shares a common identity. Where 
this sense of identity comes from, whether it is malleable or permanent and whether it can be 
contained from malignancy are large topics on which much has been written
19 and much more 
remain to be written. I shall here treat these as primitives by simply assuming that, when playing 
such games, people make use of some pre-existing sense of identity to decide how they will 
classify their opponents and how they will play against them.   
  Let me return to the assumption where α  is a constant and work with the more 





< <α .  It is not as if I am assuming that everybody feels altruism 
vis-a-vis everybody, but simply that, when i feels altruism towards j, it is always at a constant 
altruism parameter of α. We could, in principle, allow the  s ' α  to differ but that would 
complicate the algebra unnecessarily. 
  To fix the idea of non-symmetric identities, let N = {1, …, n} be the set of all people and 
for each i0N, let G(i) be the set of people with whom i believes that she shares identity. The 
presumption is that i’s altruism extends only to members of G(i). In the above section, we 
assumed G(i)= N, for all i0N. That is, everyone shared the same identity, which in other words 
means that there was no sense of group identity of any consequence. What is now being claimed 
is that that need not always be true.  
 Define  C / {X δ N∗there exists i0N, such that X = G(i)}. If C happens to be a partition of 
N, then the analysis will be virtually the same as in the above sections. Within each element of 
the partition, the game is played exactly as described above. If we suppose people feel altruism 
only for their own group members, then we could do the same analysis as in sub-section 3.2, but 
simply think of each group as a society.  The analysis then is trivial.  When people play across 
groups they are selfish, that is, they choose D.  But within each group there could be cooperation 
or defection as in section 3.2. So we could, for instance, have an equilibrium, where group A 
                                                 
19 See Tajfel, 1974; Macy, 1997; Turner, 1999; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Basu, 2005; Sen, 2006.   20
cooperates and progress economically, whereas group B is a fractious community living in 
poverty.  
The interesting variations occur when C is not a partition. Suppose society consists of 
two groups. Let a fraction γ  of the population belong to group A (A can be race, caste or the fact 
of belonging to the same fraternity) and  ) 1 ( γ −  belong to group B.  Hence,  n γ  is the population 
of A and  n ) 1 ( γ −  is the population of B. In the formal language developed above, C = {A, 
AχB}, where {A, B} is a partitition of N.  
  So the people of group B think of A and B as a common identity, that is, their identity is a 
general national identity, whereas those in group A share an in-group identity with members of 
A. It could be that members of group A recognize each other because, for instance, they belong 
to a secret society, whereas to members in B everybody looks the same.  So members of B feel 
altruism for all individuals in this society and cannot tell who belongs to A and who belongs to 
B.  But members of A can tell a member of A from a non-member, and they have cultivated 
altruism α  only towards their own group members. 
  Now when a type-B meets another player, the probability that the other player will 
cooperate is, at most, (1- ). γ  Hence, using the same calculation that went behind equation (1) we 
can see that a type-B will cooperate only if 


















        ( 4 )  
  Assume, for instance, that  5 / 2 = α .  Then (4) gives us the condition  7 / 2 ≤ γ .  Let us 
suppose this is true and all type-B’s cooperate.  Type A’s, on the other hand, cooperate only with 
their own types. 
  Hence in this equilibrium type A’s earn an expected dollar income of  ) 1 ( 8 6 γ γ − +  every 
time they play the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  This is because whenever they meet a type A 
(probability γ ) they earn $6 and, when they meet type B (the trusting type whom they let down), 
they earn $8. 
  On the other hand, the expected income of type B is  ) 1 ( 6 γ − .  Hence, type A’s earn more 
than B’s.  But not just that, type A’s, by forming this in-group collusive block, earn more than   21
they would have earned if they cooperated with all.  The latter would give them a per-game 
income of $6. 
  There is a Machiavellian lesson tucked away in this algebra. Consider the case where 
5 / 2 = α  and  7 / 2 > γ . We know from (4) that type B’s will now not cooperate. It is however in 
the interest of type A’s to get them to play cooperatively, because that way they can be better 
‘exploited’. One way of restoring the ‘exploitative equilibrium’ is for type A’s to decide, 
collusively, not to play D against type B’s always, but to occasionally play C. This will enable 
them to delude the masses into believing that they all share one common identity and play 
collusively at all times. It is in fact arguable that some of the most successful exploitations of the 
masses rely, wittingly or unwittingly, on strategies of this kind.  
  One question that may arise in the reader’s mind is about the general applicability of 
these results, since all the derivations are being done here with the example of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and that too for a certain class of payoffs. This would indeed have been cause for 
concern if I were trying to establish general results—about what will always be true in society. 
Instead, the aim here is to illustrate how society can exhibit certain kinds of behavior that were 
treated as not possible in our textbook models. We have just shown how some groups can use 
their innate traits of (in-group) altruism to control or even exploit other groups. It is not being 
claimed that this will always happen but simply that it can happen under plausible conditions. 
Hence, the illustration of this argument with a game that is accepted as a good model for some 
social situations suffices for the present context. Of course, testing the frontiers of its 
generalization would be an interesting exercise for the future.  
 
3.5  Focal Identity 
  The discussion of in-group trust draws attention to another difficulty that could arise with 
identity-based collusive behavior.  As we have already seen, even if people want to trust others 
and cooperate, one problem could arise from there being no ‘focal identity’ in the society.  In 
subsections 3.2 and 3.3 we had assumed that an entire nation shares a common identity and they 
are bound by a common altruism towards all (though in 3.3 one person’s extent of altruism could 
be different from another’s). In 3.4 we saw cases where there could be conflicting identities and 
this could lead to a subset of society playing cooperatively.   22
  One variant of this problem can lead to a total failure in cooperation in society.  It is of 
course well-recognized that we have multiple identities and this can often (in fact, I believe, 
more often than not) help hold societies together (Sen, 2005; Dahrendorf, 1959).  But this can 
also lead to a failure of cooperation. To see this suppose people in a country resolve to be 
cooperative among those with whom he or she share their primary identity. But if this society 
lacks a focal identity or has overlapping identities instead of partitioned identities, cooperation 
may fail to occur in equilibrium. 
  To see this suppose in a nation there are two races, 1 and 2, two religions, 1 and 2, and 
two language groups, 1 and 2.  Using notation in an obvious way, we can describe a person as 
(1,2,1) or (2,2,1) and so on, where (1,2,1) means a person of race 1, religion 2 and language 1.  
Let me use A to denote the set of all people of type (1,2,1), B to denote all of type (1,1,2) and C 
to denote (2,1,1).  Assume 1/3
rd the population is of type A, 1/3
rd of type B and 1/3
rd of type C. 
  Let us now assume that all A’s think that race is the primary identity (that is, they try to 
be cooperative with all and only those who share their race), all B’s think that religion is the 
primary identity and all C’s think that one’s mother-tongue is the primary identity.  In this 
society, each person will find that at least 1/3
rd of the times they will have the other player 
choose defect. 
  Hence, we can see that if α  is less than ½, the right-hand term in (1) is greater than 1/3.  
Since in this society λ  is below 1/3, by (1) we know that no one will play cooperatively.  Thus, 
even if every player has 
5
2
= α , no cooperation will occur in this society.  The reason for this is 
the lack of a focal identity. 
  This has the policy implication that if a government or some collectivity wants to 
encourage cooperative behavior in the country or among its members, it must try to create a focal 
identity among its citizens. Various repressed groups that fail to rise collectively against their 
oppressors probably do so for reasons of an absence of a focal identity among themselves. This 
is an equally useful result for a tyrant or powerful government trying to prevent some group or 
nation from acting cooperatively within itself. The aim must be to destroy the group’s ability to 
form a focal identity. Through a deliberate policy of splintering the group’s identity into various 
overlapping and conflicting identities it can keep the group under control and keep at bay the 
possibility of group rebellion. If you can break up a large group into a partition of smaller   23
groups, that can be useful in foiling rebellion. But if you can destroy the large group’s focal 
identity by nurturing overlapping identities you can do even more damage to the large group. 
This is the reason why analysis of this kind can be useful and dangerous.  
 
4.  Remarks 
 
  The model above is best treated as an allegory of the real world. Nevertheless, it talks to 
us about policy and, like all science, does so whether our aims are noble or mean. It tells us how 
to prosper economically and gives hints and suggestions for people trying to cooperate among 
themselves and escape oppression, and also for people wanting to cooperate in order to oppress 
others, not belonging to their group. It shows, for instance, that one way to exploit a large mass 
of people is to form a collusive sub-group the members of which identify primarily with the sub-
group but deludes the large mass into believing that it identifies totally with the large mass. Of 
course, and mercifully, the effort of the sub-group can be foiled by there being other sub-groups 
trying to do the same. If too many opportunistic groups come into existence, society could 
crumble into the low-output equilibrium of selfish anarchy.  
  A central lesson that comes out from this allegory and one that contrasts sharply with 
popular wisdom concerns the ubiquitous ‘invisible hand.’ The ‘invisible hand theorem’, which 
has come down to us from Adam Smith
20, and was discussed in section 1, has had enormous 
influence in shaping economic policy and has been prominent in the advice that various think 
tanks and organizations, not to mentions legions of economists, have given to developing 
country governments. One inadvertent implication of the theorem that many have taken away 
from it and that has had considerable influence on the organization of our economic and social 
life and also in the way we conduct ourselves is that it is fine to be selfish, since in the end that is 
good for society
21. This selfishness axiom has in recent times spilled over into other disciplines, 
such as sociology and the new political science.  
As a consequence, we are taught that not only are consumers and producers necessarily 
self-seeking but so are politicians, bureaucrats and judges; and, more significantly, that that is 
                                                 
20 As a digression on attribution, note that, though modern social scientists treat the ‘invisible hand’ as the central 
message of Smith’s Wealth of Nations, it is in reality a trivially small part of that book, and occurs when dealing 
with international trade. Smith had used the expression earlier, but in a different sense, in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) and even earlier in “History of Astronomy,” which was however published posthumously.   24
fine. This has some alarming consequences. It means that all we can expect of a judge is for 
verdicts that best serve his or her own interest. And so the only way to make judges and 
magistrates give just verdict is to design the institutional and incentive structure of the courts in 
such a way that it is in each judge’s self-interest to be just.  
  This ubiquitous philosophy has been damaging not only socially and morally but even in 
terms of economic growth and development, because the truth about development is that it needs 
human beings to be other-regarding, fair, and trustworthy. And since these traits are innately 
available to most of us, what we need is not to have them muted through training and 
socialization. Take the problem of bureaucratic corruption, which has been eating into the fabric 
of so many societies, and blighting the possibility of development. The standard policy response 
to this, inspired by the popularity of the invisible hand theorem and the very visible global 
economists, is to argue that government ought to redesign the system of incentives and 
punishments for bureaucrats. What we do not say is that the ubiquity of corruption has a lot to do 
with the lack (or, more appropriately, suppression) of personal integrity and individual moral 
commitments. The design of incentives plays a role, but a bigger role is played by our own sense 
of values and morals. Governments which are non-corrupt are largely so not because of third-
party monitoring of such corruption but because of the self-monitoring of bureaucrats. There is 
no scope for this in standard economics because it provides little space to self-monitoring.     
  Hence, there is no reason to believe that countries with rampant corruption are populated 
by citizens who are innately less moral; but simply that they act less morally in equilibrium. This 
is related to the findings from the celebrated experiments by Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993). 
They showed that in games where one can be selfish to different degrees, economists play the 
most selfishly. There are different ways of interpreting the result but I take the view that, since 
economists learn from their textbooks that everybody is selfish and it is fine to be selfish, they, 
like all human beings, try to conform to what they take to be the standard behavior (see also 
Rubinstein, 2006)
22. In corrupt environments, people begin to treat corruption as the norm 
(moreover deviating from that norm also has larger costs than in more honest environments) and, 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 This is what  makes the occasional dissenting voice refreshing: see Rubinstein (2006a). 
22 It is conceivable though that in experimental and examination-like situations people give the answers they feel are 
expected of them, and so these findings merely reflect the disciplinary training of economists; and that, in reality, the 
behavior of economists would be no different form that of others.   25
like economists in the above-mentioned experiments, try to replicate what they take to be normal 
behavior.    
   The starkest examples of this one sees in the streets of Third World countries. With 
drivers willing to break every rule and showing a relentless commitment to serving their own 
interests and with very little presence of the traffic warden, the streets of the Third World should 
be textbook models of neoclassical efficiency. The fact that they are not should alert us to the 
possibility that the central message of so many of our textbooks may just be wrong.  
The truth is that human beings are not relentlessly selfishness—though they can learn to 
be so if it is drilled into them that that is normal or they grow up in societies caught in an ethos of 
selfish-behavior; and, if we want society to progress and economic development to occur, we 
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